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NOTES
BEYOND CONFUSION: REEXAMINING
TRADEMARK LAWS GOALS IN THE WORLD
OF ONLINE ADVERTISING
PAUL L. BONEWITZt
INTRODUCTION
Trademark law has its roots in the common law of deceit.1
Trademarks emerged as "identifier[s] of the particular source of
particular goods,"2 functioning to inform, not deceive, the public.
Preventing confusion has therefore been the core policy
underlying trademark law since its inception.3 Given the origin
of trademark law, it is no surprise that current trademark uses
typically avoid confusion by passing accurate and reliable
information from trademark holders to consumers.
Trademark law does not prevent confusion, however, simply
for the sake of preventing confusion. Legal theory has
increasingly recognized that prohibiting confusing trademark
uses is largely a means employed to achieve other goals. 4
Chiefly, however, leading scholars have advanced the view that
"trademark law ... can best be explained on the hypothesis that
the law is trying to promote economic efficiency."5 Specifically,
economists have justified trademark law on the grounds that it
decreases consumer search costs. 6 In theory, then, the language
t J.D. Candidate, June 2008, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2004,
Tufts University.
1 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989) ("The
law of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law tort of deceit: its general
concern is with protecting consumers from confusion as to source.").
2 Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002).
3 See id.
4 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 2:2, at 2-3 (4th ed. 2006).
5 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law,
78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 267 (1988).
6 See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 2:5, at 2-7 to -10; see also Joseph
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of confusion has worked within trademark law as a "proxy for
incorporating considerations of consumer search costs." 7
Congress codified this proxy in 1946 when it passed the
Lanham Act, which prohibited trademark uses in commerce that
were "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive. '8  More recently, however, Congress has expanded
trademark liability beyond the realm of confusing uses. In 1995,
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act created a federal right of
action targeting unauthorized trademark uses that diluted
famous marks, but disclaimed the need to prove a likelihood of
confusion.9  In keeping with the statute's language, several
circuits have interpreted the Act as requiring only a showing of
actual economic harm. 10 Moreover, the stated justifications for
proscribing trademark dilution were largely economic and
included reducing consumer search costs. In this instance,
achieving economic efficiencies replaced avoiding confusion as
the explicit touchstone of trademark liability.
Several commentators have argued that online trademark
uses are analogous to offline uses and that, therefore, no law
beyond the confusion-based Lanham Act is needed to account for
them. In at least one instance, Congress disagreed,
extending dilution protection to the internet through the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, specifically
to account for the then unfamiliar practice of registering
trademarks as domain names.11 Equally unfamiliar trademark
uses currently exist in the world of online advertising. In
particular, businesses using other companies' trademarks in
search-based advertising and contextual advertising have
frequently faced litigation. Lacking new legislation, courts have
turned to trademark doctrine developed in the offline world. The
results have been predictably inconsistent. Using a doctrine
Fischer, Harmonization of Federal Patent and Trademark Laws After the Vornado,
Zip Dee, and Thomas & Betts Decisions: An Economic Analysis, 8 FED. CIR. B.J. 29,
32 (1998) ("Th[e] lowering of search costs is the primary economic purpose of
trademark laws.").
7 Maureen A. O'Rourke, Defining the Limits of Free-Riding in Cyberspace:
Trademark Liability for Metatagging, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 277, 307 (1997-98).
8 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (West 2007).
9 See Paul Edward Kim, Comment, Preventing Dilution of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act: Why the FTDA Requires Actual Economic Harm, 150 U. PA.
L. REV. 719, 728 (2001).
10 See id. at 742-44.
11 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1129 (West 2007).
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known as "initial interest confusion" that traditionally addressed
a form of pre-sale confusion, several courts found instances of
trademark infringement even while acknowledging that no
confusion was likely to occur. 12 Critics have charged that such
holdings contravene not only the Lanham Act's express confusion
requirement, but also the underlying goals of trademark law.
This Note asserts that although such holdings clearly violate
the Lanham Act, they may nonetheless be justifiable on
normative grounds. Despite critics' suggestions, certain online
advertising techniques differ from their offline counterparts. The
advent of search engines and contextual advertising has allowed
commercial actors to not only transmit information to consumers,
but to also respond to trademark selections made by consumers
in ways that actively interfere with their search activity, in some
cases even impeding consumers from reaching their objectives.
This Note argues that in the limited instances where non-
confusing trademark uses increase consumer search costs,
legislation is needed both to provide certainty and uniformity to
an open area of law, and to better effectuate trademark law's
goals.
Part I of this Note traces the theoretical and statutory
expansion of trademark law from its originally limited focus on
preventing confusion to its currently broader concern with
economic efficiencies. Part II first describes the mechanics of
internet advertising practices, including keyword search-based
advertising and contextual advertising. It then discusses several
cases in which courts ignored the Lanham Act's confusion
requirement when applying the doctrine of initial interest
confusion to online advertising practices. Finally, Part III
critiques the validity of popular analogies between online and
offline advertising and, finding significant differences, concludes
by suggesting that the existence of situations in online
advertising in which trademark uses increase search costs
without creating confusion justifies limited legislative extension
of trademark protection.
12 See infra Part II.B.
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I. THE THEORETICAL AND STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT OF
TRADEMARK LAW
A. The Evolving Understanding of Trademark Objectives
Trademark protection began as a part of the larger body of
unfair competition law.13 Genealogically, unfair competition was
related to the common-law tort of deceit, which proscribed some
forms of intentional misrepresentation. 14 Like deceit, trademark
law's main focus was consumer protection. 15 Unlike deceit,
trademark law addressed situations in which consumers were
confused, regardless of the intent of the party making the
representation. 16
From this beginning, legal scholarship has made efforts to
articulate the harms to consumers resulting from confusing
trademark uses. While commentators have offered varying
rationales of trademark protection, microeconomic theory
currently provides one that enjoys widespread acceptance. On
this hypothesis, the central objectives of trademark law are
facilitating the efficient transmission of useful information in
markets and reducing consumer search costs.1 7 Trademarks,
when utilized as source identifiers, save consumers time and
effort by providing useful shorthand for information about a
product's characteristics. Confusing trademarks decrease
efficiency by impeding consumers from locating desired goods.,
Economic analysis correctly explains the economic efficiencies
13 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 2:7, at 2-14 ("[Trademark law is a species of the
generic law of unfair competition.").
14 See 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 4 (2001).
15 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 2:14, at 2-31 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989)).
16 See, e.g., id. § 2:8, at 2-15.
17 See Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill
in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 548 (2006) ("[T]he law's core mission, as it
is understood today, is to facilitate the transmission of accurate information .... );
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the
Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 777 (2004) (finding that "reducing consumer search
costs" is part of the "central goal of the Lanham Act").
is See Bone, supra note 17, at 548 (stating that the main purpose of trademark
law is to "facilitate the transmission of accurate information to the market"); Dogan
& Lemley, supra note 17, at 786 ("In economic terms, trademarks contribute to
economic efficiency by reducing consumer search costs."); Mark A. Lemley, Property,
Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1058 (2005) ("The
economic support for [trademark law] must be found.., in efforts to reduce
consumer search costs .... ).
[Vol. 81:899
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achieved by avoiding confusion, and further suggests that the
purpose of trademark law is not to avoid consumer confusion, but
rather, to benefit consumers economically. 19 Economic theory
thus advances the possibility that avoiding confusion might be
only one among multiple ways to serve trademark law's larger
purpose.
B. Expansion of Federal Trademark Protection
1. The Lanham Act
Congress advanced a trademark policy centered on avoiding
confusion in 1946 when it passed the Lanham Act.20 The very
text of the Lanham Act prohibits only trademark uses that are
"likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 21
Congress intended to accomplish two goals through this
requirement. First, Congress sought to protect consumers from
confusing uses of trademarks. 22 As discussed above, trademarks
that clearly identify their sources reduce consumer search costs.
Second, Congress intended to protect trademark holders from the
misappropriation of the goodwill they had developed in their
marks.23  Protecting goodwill, while it appears to focus on
benefiting trademark owners, also works to the economic benefit
of consumers.
"Goodwill" is a term of art not subject to precise definition,
but economists have defined it functionally as "the public esteem
or favorable reputation that a firm enjoy[s], or simply those
habits or customs that create[] buying inertia."24 The ability of
19 As Judge Posner stated, "The fundamental purpose of a trademark is to
reduce consumer search costs .. " Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir.
2002).
20 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n (2000).
21 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (West 2007).
22 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
23
The congressional reports preceding the passage of the Lanham Act
emphasize that the goals behind protecting trademarks are "to protect the
public from deceit, to foster fair competition, and to secure to the business
community the advantages of reputation and goodwill by preventing their
diversion from those who have created them to those who have not."
Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of
Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 125 (2005) (quoting S. REP. No. 79-1333,
at 3 (1946)).
24 Bone, supra note 17, at 583 (noting that goodwill has been defined in terms of
"favorable mental states"); see also Rothman, supra note 23, at 127 ("A company's
2007]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
trademark owners to protect the reputation associated with their
marks provides incentives to develop strong marks. Strong
marks, in turn, reduce consumer search costs. 25  Protecting
goodwill is, therefore, a means employed to achieve the common
end of consumer protection. The trademark holder benefits only
incidentally. 26 Thus, the Lanham Act, as originally passed, stuck
to the language of confusion while advancing consumers'
economic interests.
2. The Federal Trademark Dilution and Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Acts
Nearly fifty years after the passage of the Lanham Act,
Congress enacted the Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA")
"in order to facilitate domestic and international commerce." 27
This Act restricted trademark use on grounds explicitly divorced
from the presence or absence of consumer confusion. 28 Instead,
economic considerations were at the forefront of this legislation,
which benefited both consumers and mark owners.
[Elconomic theory teaches that dilution has the potential to
harm consumers. That is, there is possible harm to both
consumers and mark owners if a once-unique designation loses
its uniqueness. The argument is that this makes it harder for
consumers to link that designation with a single source-the
hallmark of a strong trademark. Under this theory, dilution
increases the consumer's search costs by diffusing the
identification power of that designation. 29
goodwill is generally thought of as the good feelings and associations that it has built
up in the minds of consumers with regard to its business or product.").
25 See Bone, supra note 17, at 618-19 ('The economic argument for condemning
goodwill appropriation is based on incentives ....").
26 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 17, at 786 ("Courts commonly describe the goal
of trademark law as avoiding consumer confusion, which has the corollary effect of
preventing the appropriation of a producer's goodwill.").
27 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (West 2007); William Marroletti, Note, Dilution,
Confusion, or Delusion? The Need for a Clear International Standard to Determine
Trademark Dilution, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 659, 674 (1999).
28 The Act proscribed "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify
and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of-
(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or
(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (current
version at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 2007)).
29 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 24:72, at 24-129.
[Vol. 81:899
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In this instance, Congress extended trademark law to account for
a situation in which trademark uses increased consumer search
costs despite the absence of confusion.
Congress extended similar principles of trademark dilution
law to the internet in the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act of 1999 ("ACPA"). 30 The ACPA dealt with the
specific problem of people registering domain names with the
"bad faith intent to profit."31  Congress determined that this
problem was beyond the scope of then existing trademark law.32
In its report, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
recommended this Act as necessary "to protect consumers and
promote electronic commerce." 33 In this instance, Congress again
protected consumers' economic interests despite the absence of
confusion. Given Congress's departure from confusion as the
"touchstone of [trademark] liability,"34 the traditional likelihood
of confusion test is now better seen as one means to achieve the
more universal purpose of reducing consumer search costs than
as itself, the ultimate end of trademark law.
II. TRADEMARKS IN ONLINE ADVERTISING
A. Internet Advertising Basics
Given the ever-growing assortment of trademark uses on the
internet, it is unsurprising that Congress has not to date
identified similar situations that justify legislative action. 35 Yet,
30 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d). "[C]ybersquatting, for instance, fits uneasily within
traditional trademark law, and courts spent some time stretching that law before
Congress and ICANN stepped in with laws and regulations designed to deal with the
problem directly." Dogan & Lemley, supra note 17, at 837.
31 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d). Specifically, this Act confronted the problem posed by
parties registering domain names for no other reason than to resell them to the
trademark owners. This behavior was beyond the reach of the Lanham Act due to
the fact that the registrants were "not actually operating a Web site under the
potentially infringing domain name, but ha[d] simply registered the name." Hugh
Latimer et al., Remedies Against Cyberpirates, WILEY REIN, May 1, 2000,
http://www.wileyrein.com/publication.cfm?pf=l&publication-id=7987.
32 See S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 2 (1999) (finding that the amendments enacted
would both "clarify the rights of a trademark owner" and "provide for adequate
remedies" to the problems of cyberpiracy and cybersquatting).
33 Id. at 1.
34 See Bone, supra note 17, at 548.
35 "Some of the recent advantages in search technology applications have
outpaced the law." Marc S. Martin, Search Engines, The Next Train Wreck? When
Technology Outpaces the Law, Companies Should Beware of Potential Legal
20071
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the realm of internet advertising contains varied practices that
do not fit easily within existing trademark law. 36
1. Advertising Through Search Engines
Most everyone who has spent any time on the internet
understands how to perform a search engine query. From the
perspective of those doing the ranking and those seeking to be
ranked, the process is more complicated. Before there can be
anything to search, those creating the search engine must index
pages into a database. 37  The largest search engines index
billions of pages.38 When a searcher enters a search term, results
are produced using any number of criteria to produce a list.39
The most popular search engines sort results using factors
contained in a "relevancy algorithm."40 Although search engines
guard their algorithms closely, some general criteria are publicly
known.
The basic strategy is to index pages on two axes: 1) relevance to
the query; and 2) overall importance. Step one, relevance,
compares the searcher's query with the text on the webpage, the
"metatags" embedded in the coding of the page, and other
aspects of the page. Step two, importance, relies on a number of
heuristics, the most important being the number of other pages
Liabilities, LEGAL TIMES (Wash., D.C.), May 16, 2005, at 21.
36 See Google Advertising, http://www.google.com/ads/glossary.html (last visited
July 21, 2007) (providing examples of various online advertising techniques).
37 See David M. Fritch, Searching for Initial Interest Confusion and Trademark
Protection in Cyberspace, 9 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y, 1, 9 (2005) ("[Mlost search
engines use automated 'spiders' or 'robots' that search the web and collect key
information from the sites they visit."); Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in
Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 511 (2005) ("Commonly, a search
engine uses automated robots to canvass the Internet for content, which then make
copies of pages they find and add those copies to the database.").
38 See Urs Gasser, Regulating Search Engines: Taking Stock and Looking
Ahead, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 201, 206 (2006) ("By 2004, MSN indexed 5 billion
documents, and in November 2004, Google increased its database index to a record
of 8 billion documents."); Martin, supra note 35, at 21 ("Google claims to have
indexed 8 billion Web pages, while Microsoft claims 5 billion, Yahoo 4.5 billion,
AskJeeves 2.5 billion and Convera more than 1 billion."); see also Fritch, supra note
37, at 6 ("The search engine is what makes the billions of pages of web-based
information accessible to the average web user.").
39 See Goldman, supra note 37, at 534 ("Algorithms can be based on a wide
variety of factors .... For example, search engines could order results alphabetically
or by date of publication.").
40 Id. ("Search engines determine the order of search results using a proprietary
methodology called a 'relevancy algorithm.' ").
[Vol. 81:899
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that link to the page, the number of pages that link to the
linking page, and so on, recursively. 41
Google, a search engine with an extremely complex algorithm, is
believed to consider over 100 different factors. 42
There are several ways that web site owners use their
competitors' trademarks to respond to a searcher's keyword
selection. First, site owners seeking more hits and greater
visibility hire computer programmers, known as "search engine
optimizers" ("SEOs"), to add their competitors' trademarks into
computer code on their web page.43  This invisible code is
commonly referred to as metadata. 44 Through the process of
optimization, programmers are able to secure higher search
rankings for their clients when a consumer enters a competitor's
trademark as a search term.45 Depending on how a specific
search engine used metadata in its relevancy algorithm, the
search engine could rank the competitor higher than the
trademark holder and even push the trademark holder off the
first page of results. 46 Given that most users only look at the top
hits for a given query,47 displacement could be extremely costly to
trademark owners and frustrate consumers seeking a particular
trademark owner. Moreover, these costs accrue regardless of
41 Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 115, 118 (2006). "Metatags... are hidden code in a Web site's programming
that may contain keywords relating to the site's subject matter." Zachary Zweihorn,
Note, Searching for Confusion: The Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine and Its
Misapplication to Search Engine Sponsored Links, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1343, 1346
(2006).
42 See Fritch, supra note 37, at 9 n.51.
43 See Goldman, supra note 37, at 536.
44 See id. (describing the "arms race" between search engine optimizers and
search engines whereby optimizers attempt to "game" the relevancy algorithm and
search engines respond by changing their algorithms constantly). "In their
legitimate form-where the descriptive tags roughly match the actual Web page and
content-meta tags are often referred to as 'search engine optimization.'" Martin,
supra note 35, at 21.
45 See Fritch, supra note 37, at 10 ("The ranking of a web page in a search
engine's results can be, to a limited extent, impacted by the metatag information a
web site developer embeds in the site's code.").
46 See id. at 9-10.
47 See id. at 8 ("Most users ... only look at a small number of prioritized results
returned by a search engine."); Goldman, supra note 37, at 535 ("Searchers do not
generally look at search results beyond the first page or two." (citing Bernard J.
Jansen et. al., Real Life Information Retrieval: A Study of User Queries on the Web,
32 SIGR FORUM 5, 17 (1998) (finding that over seventy-five percent of searchers look
at only one or two pages))).
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whether the consumer mistakenly believes that there is any
association between the competitor and the displaced mark
owner.
A second way that keywords are used in conjunction with
search engines is through the use of "keyed" advertising. 48 By
far, the largest source of search engine revenue comes from
selling various types of advertisements in response to searcher
queries. 49  Search engines typically sell keywords-including
trademarked terms-to the highest bidder, who may or may not
be the trademark holder.50 One popular form the ads take is the
sponsored link,5' which appears either directly above the organic
search results or alongside them. 52 Consumer understanding of
the distinction between organic results and sponsored links is
low. 53 As the Legal Times explained in 2005:
The results of a recent poll by the Pew Internet and American
Life Project indicate that only one in six users of Internet search
engines can differentiate between actual responses to their
search and paid advertisements tied to their search term.
Furthermore, only 38 percent of Web searchers even realize this
distinction exists. 54
48 See Zweihorn, supra note 41, at 1376-78.
49 See Gasser, supra note 38, at 207 ("[Advertisement is the main revenue
source of many search engines-including players such as Google, Yahoo!,
AskJeeves, and Looksmart."); John Handy, Note, Why the Initially Confused Should
Get a Clue: The Battle Between Trademark Infringement and Consumer Choice
Online, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 567, 571 (2006) ("[S]earch
engines operated by Google and Netscape Communications Corp. ("Netscape") have
generated significant revenue by selling advertisements 'keyed' to certain
keywords."); Zweihorn, supra note 41, at 1369 ("Google sold more than $1 billion in
these sponsored links in just the last three months of 2004.").
50 See Martin supra, note 35, at 21 (displaying how advertisers can select any
combination of terms to key their ads, including someone else's trademarked terms).
Google's targeting advertising service, AdWords, operates in just this manner by
letting advertisers "bid on the right to have their advertisements appear when
certain keywords are searched .... Zweihorn, supra note 41, at 1369. AdWords has
been the target of much litigation. See Google's AdWords Under Attack-Overview
Over the Pending Lawsuits, http://www.linksandlaw.com/adwords-pendinglawsuits
.htm (last visited July 19, 2007).
51 Recently, Google has begun to refer to these as "text ads." See Google
Advertising, http://www.google.com/ads/glossary.html (last visited July 19, 2007).
52 In Google's AdWords, "the advertisements appear next to the main search
results in a separate column labeled 'Sponsored Links.'" Zweihorn, supra note 41, at
1369.
53 See Martin, supra note 35, at 21.
54 Id.
[Vol. 81:899
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Sponsored links, therefore, present a significant risk of confusion
as consumers will frequently assume an association between
their selected keyword and the sponsored links that are
generated.
Banner advertising linked to keyword selection operates
similarly to sponsored links, except that the banner
advertisements are not presented as search results.5 5 Rather,
they are usually displayed as a combination of graphics and text
appearing in a box along one of the sides of the webpage. 56 Due
to their appearance and placement, these ads are more readily
distinguishable from the list of organic search results. 57
Therefore, searchers are less likely to assume an association
between the trademarked keyword and the corresponding banner
ad. In addition, placement adjacent to the organic results list
means that banner ads do not displace the trademark owner.
2. Contextual Advertising
Broadly speaking, contextual advertising is advertising that
is responsive to an internet user's web-browsing behavior.58 In
this process, software downloaded onto a computer tracks search
behavior, typically by reading the content of the pages visited.59
When the program finds a word included on a list within the
software code, it triggers the display of an ad related to that
word.6° Software used in contextual advertising is commonly
referred to as adware, spyware, or malware, depending on how it
operates. 61
55 See Google Advertising, http://www.google.com/ads/glossary.html (last visited
July 19, 2007).
56 Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir.
2004) ("Advertisements appearing on search result pages are called 'banner ads'
because they run along the top or side of a page much like a banner.").
57 See id. (stating that banner ads can be distinguished from the user's ordinary
results list because they are on the top or side of the query results).
58 The "context" referred to in this situation is Web user behavior that provides
the advertiser information about the user's interests. See Handy, supra note 49, at
572.
59 See Spyware Info: What Is Spyware?, http://www.spywareinfo.com.articles/
spyware (last visited July 20, 2007). Contextual advertising can also overlap with
keyed advertising in situations where the software reads searcher keywords and
uses them to trigger pop-ups. See WhenU.com, WhenU SaveNow Help,
http://www.whenu.com/productssavenow help.html (last visited July 19, 2007).
60 See Spyware Info: What Is Spyware?, http://www.spywareinfo.com.articles/
spyware (last visited July 20, 2007).
61 See Spyware Adware Malware Information, http://www.spyware-removal-
20071
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The ads produced by contextual advertising software are
referred to categorically as pop-up advertising, but consist of
several types of ads.62 True pop-up ads appear in separate
windows in front of the window the user is currently viewing,
obscuring part of or all of the window and forcing the user to
suspend their search activity and respond to the ad by either
clicking on it or closing it.63 Pop-unders appear behind the page
that the user currently has open.64 Overlays appear within the
current browser window and frequently offer no way for the user
to close them or make it difficult for the user to discern the
means of closing them.65
The form of the ad affects both the likelihood of confusion
and the degree to which it interferes with an ongoing search.
Overlays, in particular, are intertwined with the page that
triggered the ad, and therefore generate the greatest risk of
making the consumer believe that the owner of the web page is
responsible for the ad. Similarly, overlays and pop-ups force a
break in browsing activity, while pop-unders-though they may
retard computer performance-are generally less intrusive.
B. Judicial Treatment of Online Advertising
When faced with trademark challenges to the above
advertising practices, courts were forced to rely upon the
Lanham Act's general likelihood of confusion standard as well
info.coml (last visited Sept. 5, 2007). Adware is downloaded by a computer user, and
is usually bundled with other software. See id. As a condition of downloading the
desired software for free, the user must agree to allow the adware to track their
search behavior and present relevant advertisements. See id. Spyware operates
similarly, except the software downloads without the user's knowledge or
authorization. Malware is even more devious, as it contains code designed
specifically to damage or disrupt a system. Id.
62 See Spyware Info: What Is Spyware?, http://www.spywareinfo.comlarticlesl
spyware/ (last visited July 20, 2007); AntiTracer, Pop-up Killer, http://www.anti
tracer.comlpopup killer.html (last visited July 20, 2007).
63 See Geoffrey D. Wilson, Comment, Internet Pop-Up Ads: Your Days Are
Numbered! The Supreme Court of California Announces a Workable Standard for
Trespass to Chattels in Electronic Communications, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 567,
569-70 (2004) ("When a pop-up ad pops up, users are forced to stop whatever they
are doing and close the newly created browser window.").
- See Google Advertising, http://www.google.comlads/glossary.html (last visited
July 16, 2007).
65 See Stacy Phillips, Stop 'Em: How Can You Avoid Those Intrusive Pop-up
Ads?, LOCATOR ONLINE, July/Aug. 2005, http://www.partslocator.com/news[back.
issues/article.details.asp?ArticleID=O70517.
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as the related case law developed for the world of offline
advertising. One branch of confusion doctrine-known as "initial
interest confusion" ("IIC")-traditionally dealt with "confusion
that creates initial customer interest, even though no actual sale
is finally completed as a result of the confusion."66 In the offline
world, courts used this doctrine in situations where consumers
were confused at the beginning of a search process, expended
time and effort to find what they believed to be the trademark
owner, but realized their mistake prior to sale.67 In the context of
metatags, banner ads, and pop-up ads, application of IIC is
proper where consumers believe a connection exists between the
advertisement or search result produced and the keyword they
selected or the website they were visiting, only to have that
confusion removed once they visited the advertiser's site. The
existence of even initial confusion is doubtful, however, where
competing advertisements are clearly labeled or otherwise
readily distinguishable from the trademark owner.
The first application of IIC to the internet occurred in the
context of metatags in the infamous case of Brookfield
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.68 In
Brookfield, the plaintiff trademark owner used the trademark
"moviebuff' on its online database of movie information. 69 West
Coast had created a similar database of movie information, which
it made available at the domain name "moviebuff.com," using the
term "moviebuff.com" in the metatags of its site. 70 In addressing
whether West Coast's use of Brookfield's trademark constituted
infringement, the court invoked IIC.71
The court first conceded that "it is difficult to say that a
consumer is likely to be confused about whose site he has reached
or to think that Brookfield somehow sponsors West Coast's web
site," and that "consumers know they are patronizing West Coast
rather than Brookfield."72 Nonetheless, the court held that IIC
existed, stating that by diverting people away from Brookfield,
West Coast "improperly benefit[ed] from the goodwill that
66 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 23:6, at 23-27.
67 See, e.g., Grotrian v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1341-42 (2d Cir. 1975).
68 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
69 Id. at 1041.
70 Id. at 1042-43.
71 See id. at 1061-66.
72 Id. at 1062.
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Brookfield developed in its mark."73 By undertaking a confusion-
free analysis while adopting a doctrine with the word "confusion"
in its name-under a statute that expressly requires a showing of
likely confusion and by explicitly referring to IIC as a "formnf of
confusion"-the court put the label of confusion on a practice that
it clearly believed was unlikely to confuse. 74 The court may have
superficially stuck to the confusion language, but as
commentators have pointed out, Brookfield Communications
"merely required searcher 'diversion.'75
The Ninth Circuit invoked IIC once again in the context of
banner advertisements in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape
Communications Corp.76 In Playboy, Plaintiff sued Netscape,
alleging that banner ads appearing when web users entered the
trademarked terms "playboy" and "playmate" onto the Netscape
search engine infringed its marks. 77  Netscape had sold to
Playboy's competitors the right to have these ads keyed to
Playboy's trademarks. 78 Banner ads displayed as a result of this
practice simply said "Click Here" and did not reveal their
source.
79
In reversing the lower court's finding of summary judgment
for Netscape, the court again invoked IIC. In contrast to
Brookfield, the court based its holding on evidence of actual
confusion, not on mere diversion.80 The court held that the fact
that the ads were unlabeled demonstrated a likelihood of
sponsorship confusion, which satisfied Playboy's IIC theory.81
73 Id.
74 See id. at 1062-66; see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 23:6, at 23-27 ("Most
courts now recognize the initial interest confusion theory as a form of likelihood of
confusion which can trigger a finding of infringement."). The court also curiously
mischaracterized the mechanics of search engines, stating that web surfers were
"taken by a search engine to 'westcoastvideo.com."' Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062. As
previously discussed, searchers are first taken to a results list and then must choose
which web site to patronize. See supra Part II.A. 1.
75 Goldman, supra note 37, at 561.
76 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
77 Id. at 1023.
78 Id. at 1022-23.
79 See id. at 1025.
80 See id. at 1026 (describing the findings of the plaintiffs expert report, which
showed evidence of consumer confusion as to sponsorship and affiliation of unlabeled
banner ads).
81 See id. at 1025-26. The court made confusion even more central to the IIC
analysis when it held that had the ads been clearly labeled, no confusion would have
occurred. Id. at 1025 n.16 ("Note that if a banner advertisement clearly identified its
source or, even better, overtly compared PEI products to the sponsor's own, no
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In 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com,8 2 the District Court
for the Southern District of New York extended IIC-based
infringement to the context of pop-up advertising. WhenU was
the owner of an adware program called "SaveNow." SaveNow
scanned "activity conducted within the SaveNow user's Internet
browser, comparing URLs, website addresses, search terms and
webpage content accessed by the SaveNow user with a
proprietary directory, using algorithms contained in the
software."8 3  As a result of these algorithms' computations,
SaveNow matched the apparent category of activity and
generated a pop-up ad from that category.8 4 When a user typed
in "1800contacts.com," SaveNow would recognize that the user
was accessing a web page in the eye care category and would
generate an eye care-related pop-up.8 5
After determining that WhenU had used the plaintiffs mark
in commerce,8 6 the court moved on to the issue of confusion.
Judge Batts found that initial interest confusion existed because
"[d]efendants' pop-up advertisements will confuse consumers into
thinking that Defendants are somehow associated with Plaintiff
or that Plaintiff has consented to their use of the pop-up
advertisements."87  The court found likely confusion despite
WhenU's use of disclaimers on their pop-up ads reading: "A
WhenU offer-click ? for info."8 8 By finding that no amount of
source identification would prevent IIC, the court essentially held
that pop-ups are per se confusing.8 9  As one commentator
suggested, "[t]his opinion arguably reflects the adoption of a
creative, albeit deviant, interpretation of the Lanham Act to
confusion would occur under PEI's theory.").
82 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 414 F.3d 400 (2d
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1033 (2005).
83 Id. at 476 (citation omitted).
84 See id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 489. The case was ultimately reversed by the Second Circuit on the
grounds that the plaintiff had failed to show "use in commerce" of their mark. See
1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 408-09 (2d Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 1033 (2005). For further discussion of this aspect of the case, see
Handy, supra note 49, at 587-89.
87 WhenU.Com, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 494.
88 Id. at 503-04 ("Even if Defendants had offered evidence of the effect of its
branding and disclaimers, such evidence would do little to counter Plaintiffs
showing of the likelihood of initial interest confusion.").
89 See Handy, supra note 49, at 591.
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advance the policy that pop-up ads are annoying and should be
illegal."90
The application of IIC to different online trademark uses has
been inconsistent by any measure. All three of the cases
discussed above found trademark infringement, but Brookfield
and When U.Com did so without undertaking a convincing
confusion analysis. Thus, the court dealing with banner ads
appeared satisfied that a confusion-based analysis adequately
guarded trademark rights, whereas courts dealing with metatags
and pop-up ads felt compelled to extended trademark protection
beyond the language of the Lanham Act. While the Brookfield
and WhenU.Com holdings part from the text of the Lanham Act,
to the extent that metatags and pop-up ads differ from both
banner ads and offline trademark uses, granting these practices
greater protection may be normatively justified on economic
grounds distinct from considerations of consumer confusion.
III. DIFFERENTIATING ONLINE PRACTICES: TREATING DIFFERENT
USES DIFFERENTLY TO REDUCE CONSUMER SEARCH COSTS
A. Analogies Between the Online and Offline Worlds
Both courts applying IIC and commentators discussing it
have drawn analogies between online advertising practices and
those in the "brick and mortar" world. 91 The common aim of
these analogies is to argue that since the online and offline
scenarios are the same, the law should treat them as such and
not devise new legal standards. 92 The most common analogy
invoked for this purpose is the product placement analogy,
whereby a jurist or scholar argues that since it is legal to place
competing products next to each other on store shelves (often
drawing on the force of each other's goodwill for initial consumer
interest), it should likewise be legal to place one's product next to
90 Id. at 591-92.
91 See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 411 (2d Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1033 (2005); Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc'ns
Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring); Dogan & Lemley,
supra note 17, at 822, 824; Handy, supra note 49, at 570-73; Zweihorn, supra note
41, at 1354, 1375-76.
92 See Handy, supra note 49, at 594 ("[T]f what is legal in brick-and-mortar is
made illegal online, perhaps courts have inadvertently changed, rather than
adapted, jurisprudence in response to new technologies.").
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that of an online competitor. 93 Such analogies have been drawn
indiscriminately across the range of internet trademark uses.94
In the context of metatags, two authors made a product
placement analogy to argue that courts should not find
infringement when trademarks are used in similar "nonconfusing
and nondiluting way[s], to capture viewers' attention in the same
way that vendors have traditionally done by placing like products
next to one another on grocery shelves."95 Continuing to draw
analogies in a discussion of keyed advertising, they argued that
"mere proximity of goods or advertisements has never been
thought to be illegal. 96
Banner ads have drawn similar discussion, most notably in
Judge Berzon's concurrence in the Playboy case. 97 She drew an
analogy to a department store patron who enters with the
objective of purchasing one brand of clothing, only to be diverted
by a "more prominently displayed" line of clothes whose location
ensured that the consumer would reach it first. 98 Commentators
have further argued that whether the trademark owner's mark
appears in text on the competing product's label will not change
93 See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, supra note 17, at 824.
Generic drug manufacturers can market their products in part by ensuring
that they appear on pharmacy shelves next to their brand-name
equivalents. Gas stations can compete by staking out adjacent street
corners.... The only way to create such proximity [online] is to permit
Internet intermediaries like search engines to offer people links to
competitive goods that they might enjoy.
Id.
94 See infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
95 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 17, at 822.
96 Id. at 824.
97 Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir.
2004) (Berzon, J., concurring).
98 See id.
I walk into Macy's and ask for the Calvin Klein section and am directed
upstairs to the second floor. Once I get to the second floor, on my way to the
Calvin Klein section, I notice a more prominently displayed line of Charter
Club clothes, Macy's own brand, designed to appeal to the same people
attracted by the style of Calvin Klein's latest line of clothes. Let's say I get
diverted from my goal of reaching the Calvin Klein section, the Charter
Club stuff looks good enough to me, and I purchase some Charter Club
shirts instead. Has Charter Club or Macy's infringed Calvin Klein's
trademark, simply by having another product more prominently displayed
before one reaches the Klein line? Certainly not.
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the result so long as that use also serves a comparative
advertising purpose. 99
Lastly, at least one court and one commentator have found
pop-up ads to be analogous to offline comparative advertising. In
reversing the district court's decision on "use in commerce"
grounds, the Second Circuit in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v.
WhenU.Com, Inc. o00 court suggested in dicta that even had
WhenU used the 1-800 Contacts mark in commerce, such use
would not have satisfied initial interest confusion. 101
Indeed, it is routine for vendors to seek specific "product
placement" in retail stores precisely to capitalize on their
competitors' name recognition. For example, a drug store
typically places its own store-brand generic products next to the
trademarked products they emulate in order to induce a
customer who has specifically sought out the trademarked
product to consider the store's less-expensive alternative. 10 2
Similarly, one commentator equated pop-up ads that force
consumers to stop web-browsing with product placement, arguing
that "[t]he analogous in-person shopping experience is simply
deciding whether or not to visit the competitor's display."10 3
Where the above analogies are accurate, there is no evident
reason to create liability online that does not exist offline.10 4 Pop-
up ads and metatags, however, go beyond providing a competitive
choice by preventing access to the trademark owner. These
99 See Handy, supra note 49, at 571-72.
[O]rdinary [query] results ... may include the Nike website and other sites
selling Nike apparel, while a banner ad for Adidas appears off to the right.
This simulates in-person shopping because, analogizing the Web to one
gigantic shopping mall, any consumer searching for a product may be
tempted by competing alternatives despite an initial interest in seeking a
specific brand.
Id.; see also Zweihorn, supra note 41, at 1375 ("A customer asks a clerk where to find
Tylenol and is directed to Aisle Three. On the way towards the Tylenol notices the
store's generic acetaminophen-conveniently located next to the Tylenol-and, after
comparing both products, decides to purchase the store brand.").
100 414 F.3d 400, 411-12 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1033 (2005).
101 See id. at 410-11. The court explicitly based their holding only on "use in
commerce" issues. See id. at 406 ("Because we agree with WhenU that it does not
'use' 1-800's trademarks, we need not and do not address the issue of likelihood of
confusion.").
102 Id. at 411. "WhenU employs this same marketing strategy by informing C-
users who have sought out a specific trademarked product about available coupons,
discounts, or alternative products that may be of interest to them." Id.
103 Handy, supra note 49, at 573.
104 See id. But see supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
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advertising practices actively impede consumers from reaching
their initial objectives, and in fact create the very economic
inefficiencies that trademark law seeks to avoid.
B. Inadequacy of the Analogies in Describing Pop-up Ads and
Metatags
With respect to metatags, a single competitor who
successfully achieves a higher ranking than the trademark owner
will only be able to displace the owner by one place on the organic
search results list.105  This attempt to make oneself "more
prominently displayed" than one's competitor parallels the
relevant analogy. 106  Nonetheless, the net effect of many
competitors engaging in this practice may be to bury the
trademark holder's website far down in the search results. 10 7
The aggregate result of widespread metatag manipulation is to
not only provide a consumer with competitive choices they might
not otherwise be aware of, but to also make it significantly
harder for a consumer to access the content they were most likely
seeking.
Similarly, pop-ups not only provide consumers with choices,
they also hamper search activity by forcing consumers to stop
and attend to unsolicited advertisements. While a single pop-up
may not present a substantial barrier, the aggregate effect of all
pop-ups clearly does. The overall level of intrusion is evidenced
by the considerable consumer frustration that pop-up ads have
generated. 08 Even without considering aggregation, the precise
level of inconvenience is a "difference of degree, not of kind."'0 9
105 This is especially true on search engines such as Google that block duplicate
content. See Harvey Kane, Duplicate Content, RAGEPANK SEO, Aug. 26, 2006,
http://www.ragepank.com/articles/43/duplicate-content.
106 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
107 See Chad J. Doellinger, Trademarks, Metatags, and Initial Interest
Confusion: A Look to the Past to Re-conceptualize the Future, 41 IDEA 173, 207
(2001) (describing the situation in the context of search engines where the link to
plaintiffs website on a results list can only be seen "if the user scrolls down the list
or clicks on a link to go to an additional page of results"); Rothman, supra note 23, at
188 ("[Tihere may still be some instances online in which a trademark holder's
website gets buried in search results.").
108 See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 63, at 571-72; see also Kevin Zaney, Down With
Pop-Ups, EWEEK.COM, Oct. 11, 2004, http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,
1666480,00.asp ("[P]op-ups are more than annoying; they change users' browsers,
add programs, retard PC performance, crash computers and collect personal data.
Even if you are able to find and uninstall a pop-up, it can rebuild itself.").
109 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 4, § 25:69, at 25-195.
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Ultimately, then, comparisons of pop-ups to product placement in
When U are incomplete and inapposite as they fail to consider the
unique burdens pop-ups place on consumer web searches.
In contrast, banner ads fit the analogy to product placement
well. Having a banner ad in a more prominent location than the
organic search results does not displace or obfuscate the organic
search results, and therefore, does not similarly burden
consumers. 110  This type of keyed advertising achieves the
competitive benefits of increased consumer choice without
obstructing the consumer from accessing the organic search
results.
While inconsistent in their application of IIC, the holdings of
all three cases are explicable on economic grounds. As non-
confusing metatags and pop-ups increase consumer search costs,
trademark law's economic policies justify the WhenU.Com and
Brookfield courts' findings of liability. Conversely, as non-
confusing banner ads do not increase search costs, liability in this
area should be limited to confusing trademark uses such as the
unlabeled banner ads in Playboy.
C. The Limitations of Search-Cost Reasoning
Proscribing non-confusing trademark uses that interfere
with consumers reaching their search objectives is only justified
on a search cost rationale, however, if the consumer's search
objective is to access the trademark owner. If a consumer is
seeking comparative information about a class of goods rather
than seeking to access a particular trademark owner, an
advertising practice that hinders them from reaching the
trademark owner does not necessarily thwart their objective or
increase their search costs.111 Upholding the foregoing rationale
thus requires that a consumer's objectives are (1) knowable and
(2) likely to include accessing the trademark owner.
110 The possible exception is a search engine, such as Yahoo Yellow Pages,
where sponsored links can occupy several full pages, thereby excluding organic
search results. See, e.g., Yahoo! Local Yellow Pages, All New Car Dealers,
http://yp.yahoo.comlpy/ypResults.py?stx=95646070&stp=y&tab=B2C&desc=All+New
+Car+Dealers&city=New+York&state=NY&zip=&uzip=lOOO7&msa=5600&country=
us&cs=4&ed=lJt4Klo2Ty2L84EwYIL9s.EdfJDCVxzAKB8NbvFtcN (last visited
July 18, 2007).
111 See Bone, supra note 17, at 618-20 (balancing the benefits of allowing
trademark owners to capture all the value of the goodwill their trademarks produce
against potential anticompetitive costs).
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When a consumer enters a keyword into an internet search
engine, a concept known as "objective opaqueness" posits that it
is impossible to know that searcher's objective. 112 The argument
runs that even if the searcher selects a trademarked term, the
search engine provides no context to help us determine where the
searcher wants to go." 3  Therefore, one cannot distinguish
between searchers who are searching the trademark because
they want to patronize the trademark owner due to the goodwill
they feel towards its products and those who are using the
trademark merely as a proxy for a class of goods." 4
Under this theory, prohibiting metatag manipulation would
simultaneously decrease the search costs of targeted searchers
and increase search costs for comparison shoppers. Determining
which interest is greater in this context demands a balancing
that may be beyond the capacity of current economic theory. 15
Fortunately, metatags are becoming less and less relevant as an
increasing number of search engines have either removed
metatags from their algorithms or have significantly discounted
them. 1 6 That being said, a circuit court of appeals case from as
recently as 2006 found trademark infringement due to the use of
trademarks in metatags. 17
Pop-ups, however, show no signs of becoming irrelevant."18
Given the fact that pop-ups are a form of contextual advertising,
they do not suffer from the problem of objective opaqueness. As
pop-ups interfere with web browsing behavior while consumers
112 See Goldman, supra note 37, at 521 (arguing that due to "objective
opaqueness," it is impossible to make any "legally-supportable inferences" from the
keywords searchers select).
113 See id.
114 See id. at 554-58 (discussing uses of trademarks for their lexical content).
115 See Lemley, supra note 18, at 1065-69 (discussing the great difficulty in
striking a proper balance between the various economic interests in the context of
intellectual property law).
116 See Fritch, supra note 37, at 12 ("[Mlost major search engines have refined
their search algorithms to minimize the ability of web site owners to manipulate
search engine placements .... "); Goldman, supra note 37, at 567 ("[A]lmost all
search engines have removed keyword metatags from their relevancy algorithms.");
Zweihorn, supra note 41, at 1363 ("The great majority of search engines now ignore
metatags.").
117 See Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2006).
118 Despite the recent success of pop-up blockers, new "unblockable" pop-ups
promise to keep similar ads on computers for years to come. See
LearnHomeBusiness.com, Unblockable PopUp Creator, http://www.learnhome
business.com/wbtbx/float/index.htm (last visited July 18, 2007).
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are already visiting specific sites, the context suggests that these
consumers are more likely to be seeking the trademark owner
whose website triggered the ad.119 Therefore, pop-up ads very
likely increase consumer search costs.
CONCLUSION
The purposes behind trademark law have evolved
substantially since common law. From a time when confusion
was the universally accepted rationale for all liability based on
trademark use, modern economic theory has grown to support
extended trademark protection in some situations. Congress
eventually endorsed this theoretical expansion by passing
trademark dilution and anticybersquatting laws.
Technology has continued to outpace the law, however, as
the internet has presented a medium in which new trademark
uses have developed rapidly. As a result, courts have approached
novel situations based on incomplete analogies and doctrine that
fails to account for the economic burdens some internet
advertising practices place on consumers. The result has been an
uncertain area of the law ill at ease with the rules that constrain
it.
In order to both serve consumers' better interests and
provide uniformity in the law, legislation is needed to address
online trademark practices that move beyond mere comparative
advertising and actively interfere with the ability of consumers to
reach desired trademark owners. Only by expressly facing these
new trademark uses apart from the strictures of the language of
confusion can trademark law fulfill its economic goals in the
context of internet advertising.
119 See supra Part II.A.2.
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